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Abstract 
Bayesian Networks (BNs) are graphical probabilistic models that have proven popular in medical 
applications. While numerous medical BNs have been published, most are presented fait accompli 
without explanation of how the network structure was developed or justification of why it represents 
the correct structure for the given medical application.  This means that the process of building 
medical BNs from experts is typically ad hoc and offers little opportunity for methodological 
improvement.  This paper proposes generally applicable and reusable medical reasoning patterns to 
aid those developing medical BNs. The proposed method complements and extends the idiom-based 
approach introduced by Neil, Fenton, and Nielsen in 2000. We propose instances of their generic 
idioms that are specific to medical BNs. We refer to the proposed medical reasoning patterns as 
medical idioms. In addition, we extend the use of idioms to represent interventional and 
counterfactual reasoning. We believe that the proposed medical idioms are logical reasoning patterns 
that can be combined, reused and applied generically to help develop medical BNs. All proposed 
medical idioms have been illustrated using medical examples on coronary artery disease. The method 
has also been applied to other ongoing BNs being developed with medical experts. Finally, we show 
that applying the proposed medical idioms to published BN models results in models with a clearer 
structure.  
 
Keywords: Bayesian Networks, Medical Idioms, Reasoning Patterns, Knowledge Elicitation  
1. Introduction 
Each year many hundreds of novel Bayesian Networks (BNs) are presented in the literature, with 
medicine being a popular application domain  [1], [2], [3], [4], [5].  Most published BNs are present as 
faits accomplis: with little explanation of how the network structure was developed and without 
justifying whether the structure is correct for a given scientific application. This problem is even more 
evident for medical BNs [5]. The process of building medical BNs, with medical experts, is typically ad 
hoc and offers little opportunity for repeatability and standardisation. However, a clear description of 
the modelling approach is necessary if clinical and patient communities are to adopt the methodology 
or resulting BN into healthcare practice.  
 
Building a BN involves two main tasks [6]: (1) determine the BN structure; and (2) specify the 
parameters. Both the BN structure and parameters can be built: (a) by automated learning from data 
if sufficient data are available [7], [8], [9]; (b) “by-hand” using knowledge elicitation methods to 
capture domain expert knowledge and extract necessary information from the literature [1], [10], [11], 
[12]; or, (c) through a combination of both [13], [14]. In many medical problems it is not feasible or 
appropriate to use automated techniques and the structure and/or parameters of the BN must be 
elicited from experts. Much research has focused on knowledge elicitation methods and considers 
how to elicit parameters from experts [15], [16] [17], [18], [19], [20], or statistically estimate them 
[21], [22], [23]. However, as articulated convincingly in [24], less attention has been paid to the 
problem of eliciting the BN structure and, in particular, causal knowledge before considering any 
learning from data [25]. Hence, in summary, the literature lacks a systematic, repeatable method for 
building medical BNs from experts and literature. 
 
There are impediments that make determining the right structure for a BN difficult, and several groups 
have proposed guidelines to help avoid spurious or unreliable models[26], [27]. Neil et al. found that 
by applying natural reasoning patterns, called idioms, BN development could be faster and deliver 
better-quality BNs. Idioms are abstract reasoning patterns from which specific cases, called instances, 
can be constructed. For example, instances of idioms have been used to develop BNs for assessing 
legal arguments [28], [29]. While Neil et al’s generic idioms are capable of broad application to many 
subject domains, this paper proposes new types of idioms specifically to develop medical BNs. We 
refer to these as medical idioms, and we extend the use of idioms to represent additional types of 
reasoning relevant in medical decision-making, including: (1) interventional; and, (2) counterfactual 
reasoning.  
 
This paper proposes a systematic and repeatable method for developing medical BNs that both 
complements and extends Neil et al’s idiom-based approach. We believe the proposed medical idioms 
can provide a basis for standardised and consistent development of medical BNs. The remainder of 
this article is organised as follows: in Section 2 we provide an overview of the foundations of BNs and 
idioms. In Section 3 related work is presented. Our proposed medical idioms are explained in Section 
4, and we include an example of how they are combined into a core BN model of coronary artery 
disease. Assessment of medical idioms against established BN models is presented in Section 5. All BN 
examples and models were implemented in AgenaRisk [30]. Our conclusions and recommendation for 
further work are presented in Section 6.   
2. Background: Bayesian networks and idioms 
2.1 Bayesian Networks 
A BN is a directed acyclic graph with qualitative and quantitative parts [31]. The qualitative part is the 
graph comprised of nodes representing random variables (discrete or continuous) and directed edges 
representing causal or influential relationships. If a directed edge connects variables A and B, such as 
A → B, then A is called parent node or ancestor of B, and B is a child node or a successor of A. For 
instance, in Figure 1a smoking is a parent of lung cancer, indicating that smoking has a causal impact 
on lung cancer. The quantitative part of a BN comprises a set of conditional probability functions 
associated with each node – captured by a Node Probability Table (NPT) - to represent the conditional 
probability distribution of each node in the BN given its parents (Figure 1b). 
 
Figure 1. (a) A three-node BN example. (b) A three-node BN example with Node Probability Tables shown 
Once values for all NPTs are provided the BN is fully parameterised and a variety of probabilistic 
reasoning processes can be performed. Bayesian probabilistic reasoning describes the process of 
updating our prior belief about an uncertain hypothesis in light of new evidence. Our initial belief is 
termed prior probability, while our updated belief is termed posterior probability.  
Once evidence is entered in the BN, the probabilities of remaining unobserved variables are updated. 
There are two ways of reasoning when evidence is entered: 
 
1. Forward reasoning: The reasoning process follows the direction of the arc. For instance, 
knowing that the patient is a smoker, increases the probability of lung cancer from 6.4% 
(Figure 2a) to 10% (Figure 2b). Forward reasoning is described as causal reasoning when the 
BN structure represents true causal relationships rather than simple associations, which is not 
an absolute requirement when we reason from evidence. 
2. Backward reasoning: The reasoning process is counter to the direction of the arc. For instance, 
knowing that the patient’s X-ray is positive increases the probability of lung cancer (Figure 2c). 
Background reasoning is also described as diagnostic reasoning when the BN structure 
represents true causal relationships. 
 
 
Figure 2. (a) BN example with marginal prior probabilities. (b) BN example, where causal reasoning is performed (Scenario 1 
appears when evidence is entered in AgenaRisk). (c) BN example, where diagnostic reasoning is performed 
A particular case of diagnostic reasoning is a phenomenon called explaining away [32], or discounting 
[33]. Explaining away occurs when a child node has more than one independent parent node. If the 
child node, or one of its ancestors, is observed, the probability of each of the parent nodes changes 
(diagnostic reasoning). But if one of the parents is known, then the probabilities of the other parents 
change. This is because the change on the child node can be explained by changes in either of the 
parent nodes, hence making the parent nodes dependant. 
BNs can also be used to answer hypothetical questions such as what will happen if an intervention is 
made. Reasoning about interventions can only be performed when relationships among the variables 
are causal because an intervention is an exogenous action that fixes the state of the variable we have 
intervened upon, making it independent of its causes [34], [31], [35]. Contrary to reasoning about 
evidence, interventional reasoning does not allow diagnostic reasoning from the intervened variable 
[36]. For instance, when we observe a high body temperature on the thermometer, we can argue that 
we have fever. However, if we arbitrarily start rubbing the thermometer to reach a specific 
temperature, it can no longer be argued that fever is present. According to Pearl [31], an externally 
imposed intervention is presented using the do operator, as in the previous example: the probability 
of having fever given that we intervened by rubbing the thermometer is presented as 𝑃(𝐹𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟 =
𝑌𝑒𝑠|𝑑𝑜(𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 = 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐵𝑜𝑑𝑦 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒)). The process of making the intervened 
variable independent of its causes by removing all the edges pointing towards that variable is known 
as graph surgery. 
 
BNs can also be used to answer counterfactual questions such as what would have happened if events 
other than those observed had happened. In BNs, counterfactual reasoning combines both evidence 
and interventions. Using the process of twin-networks proposed by Pearl [31], the actual world is 
modelled based on evidence while the hypothetical counterfactual world is altered using 
interventions. In a twin network both networks have identical structures except for the arrows 
towards the variable that we intervene upon, which are missing in the hypothetical world. The 
posterior probabilities of the variables, which remain the same in both worlds, are called background 
variables, and are shared between the two networks. The main difference between counterfactuals 
and interventions is that for the former we know the values that some or all the variables had in the 
actual world. By contrast, when we intervene, we are unaware of the values of the predecessor 
variables in the network. 
2.2 Idioms 
Neil et al. [26] introduced an idiom-based approach to describe how elicited variables should be 
connected. In their book [37], Fenton and Neil present four idioms that cover a wide range of 
modelling tasks:   
1. Cause-consequence idiom: Models uncertainty of a causal process with observable 
consequences. The cause-consequence idiom has a chronological order: the consequence 
follows the cause and not the other way around. For instance, as shown in Figure 3, a car 
accident causes head injury.  
 
Figure 3. A medical example of the cause-consequence idiom proposed by Fenton and Neil (2018) 
2. Measurement idiom: Models uncertainty surrounding the accuracy of any type of 
measurement. The causal directions here can be interpreted in a straightforward way. The 
actual value of the attribute must exist before it is measured (by a person or machine). The 
measurement has a known accuracy. The higher the accuracy, the closer the assessed value 
is expected to be to the actual value of the attribute. For example, as shown in Figure 4, the 
result of an X-ray test is a measurement for assessing internal chest bleeding. Although a 
positive or negative result is strongly indicative of whether there is internal chest bleeding or 
not, there are inevitably false positives and false negatives. In Figure 4a the full version of the 
measurement idiom is presented, where the X-ray accuracy is either standard (having 1% false 
positive and 5% false negative rate), or perfect. In Figure 4b, only a standard X-ray test is 
assumed. Diagnostic reasoning is performed. The latent or difficult to observe/measure 
attribute becomes a special case of the measurement idiom. 
 
Figure 4. (a) A medical example of the standard measurement idiom proposed by Fenton and Neil (2018). (b) A medical 
example of the implicit measurement idiom proposed by Fenton and Neil (2018) 
3. Definition/synthesis idiom: Models synthesis or combination of many nodes into one synthetic 
to cover the following cases: (1) defining a synthetic node in terms of its parents (Figure 5a); 
(2) combining variables using a hierarchical structure (Figure 5b); or, (3) combining different 
nodes together to reduce the parameters in the NPTs (Figure 5c).    
 
Figure 5. (a) A medical example of the definitional/ synthesis idiom for case 1; definitional relationship between variables, 
proposed by Fenton and Neil (2018). (b) A medical example of the definitional/ synthesis idiom for case 2; hierarchical 
definitions, proposed by Fenton and Neil (2018). (c) A medical example of the definitional/ synthesis idiom for case 3; reduce 
effects of combinatorial explosion, proposed by Fenton and Neil (2018) 
4. Induction idiom: Models uncertainty related to inductive reasoning based on populations of 
similar or exchangeable members. The induction idiom is a general model for any type of 
statistical inference represented using a BN. The main difference is that an unknown or 
partially known population parameter is learned from known data (Figure 6).   
 
Figure 6. A medical example of the induction idiom proposed by Fenton and Neil (2018) 
3. Related work 
Several knowledge engineering methods have been proposed to support development of complex BN 
structures. For example, Laskey and Mahoney [38], [39], [40] recognised that BN construction requires 
a method for specifying meaningful building blocks which they called network fragments. A network 
fragment consists of a set of related random variables together with knowledge about how they are 
related. Ideally, fragments should make sense to the domain expert who must supply some underlying 
motive or reason for their existence. Koller and Pfeffer [41] proposed an abstract approach to support 
the construction of large BNs, known as Object-Oriented BNs (OOBNs). An OOBN is made up of classes 
that contain both ordinary BN nodes as well as abstract objects, representing instances of other 
classes. A class can be considered as a network fragment. OOBNs are particularly useful for complex 
models that contain repeated fragments, where objects can be reused to decrease the modelling 
effort. Network fragments and OOBNs are both useful when organising and decomposing a large, 
complex BN, but they do not explain the connection and reasoning among variables elicited from 
domain experts. 
 
More guidance for developing a BN is given from the following types of dependency connection, 
known also as d-connection: 
1. Serial connection: C is conditionally dependent on B, which is conditionally dependent on A. A 
and C become conditionally independent, also known as d-separated, given that B is known 
(Figure 7a). 
2. Diverging connection: A and C are conditionally dependent on B. A and C become conditionally 
independent given that B is known (Figure 7b).  
3. Converging connection: B is conditionally dependent on A and C. A and C are conditionally 
dependent only when B or any of its descendants, if available, are known (Figure 7c).  
 
 
Figure 7. (a) Serial connection. (b) Diverging connection. (c) Converging connection 
These three conditional dependencies can aid in connecting a small number of variables and verifying 
the reasoning process between them. However, in practice, experts do not think in terms of 
conditional dependencies. Medical BNs are complex and are composed from many variables. Thus, 
using the proposed dependency connections as the only guidance for developing medical BNs can be 
problematic.  
 
Few semantic approaches have also been proposed for assisting the development of BNs. Kjaerulff 
and Madsen [25] propose an overall causal BN structure using abstract variables classes. Other 
researchers have explained the BN structure using abstract templates, where relationships between 
elicited variables were implicitly described. For instance, Helsper and van der Gaag [42] propose a 
methodology for building a BN for the domain of oesophageal cancer from ontologies. Derivation of 
the structure from the proposed ontology is conducted by addressing semantically meaningful units 
of knowledge. Seixas et al. proposed a three-level diagnostic BN structure [43]. Shwe et al. proposed 
a Quick Medical Reference (QMR) network built on statistical and expert knowledge [44]. The QMR 
belief network is a two-level graphical model, where the top level contains binary nodes representing 
diseases and the bottom level contains binary nodes representing findings. There are several 
conditional independence assumptions that restrict the QMR network structure. First, the diseases 
are assumed to be marginally independent, thus it does not entertain established comorbidities 
routinely observed in clinical practice. Second, findings are assumed to be conditionally independent 
given the known diseases’ states. Third, and finally, findings are all modelled as manifestations of the 
disease, an assumption that is incorrect when modelling historical findings. In a later version of QMR 
network proposed by Pradhan et al. [21], background variables representing predisposing factors 
were included. This resulted into a three-level BN structure. Velikova et al. [45] present a template on 
how to model temporal BNs where the relationships between a few key medical variables were 
described. Still other have instead focused on proposing a pattern for modelling specific parts of a 
medical BN, such as the coexistence of two or more comorbid conditions [46], [47]. Luciani and 
Stefanini [48], [49] propose an automated interview for eliciting specific medical variables from 
experts and a way to connect them. The described templates and semantics are beneficial under 
certain circumstances; however, they are either too narrow, targeting only specific variable types, or 
they offer an overall structure without some underlying method or an explanation of the reasoning 
patterns to encourage reusability.    
4. Medical idioms 
 
As illustrated in Figure 8 and established from literature on the classical approaches to diagnosis and 
treatment, while there is much information and many tests that can help clarify the medical condition 
[50], [51], it remains difficult for humans alone to detect, comprehend and correctly identify the 
presence of the underline cause [52], [53]. It is in the feedback loops, presented in Figure 8, where 
conditions are diagnosed and treatments selected that many believe Artificial Intelligence (AI), of 
which BNs are one type, can help [54], [55], [56]. Further, it is as a novel component of the resource-
intensive and multidisciplinary process of developing that AI where we position our medical idioms as 
one methodology capable of helping bridge the barriers between medical knowledge and decision 
science, with the effect of simplifying the elicitation task. 
 
 
Figure 8: The Classical diagnostic and management loops 
A medical BN should capture all relevant clinical variables and follow the causal mechanisms of the 
medical problem and care as described in Figure 8. When building a medical BN using knowledge 
elicitation methods, the model expert follows logical causal patterns to connect elicited variables. 
Idioms represent natural and reusable reasoning patterns that follows human reasoning processes. 
Consequently, idioms form the basis of our methodology for developing medical BNs. However, each 
generic idiom presented in Section 2.2 covers many medical scenarios that should be differentiated. 
Therefore, we propose instances of the generic idioms that represent specific medical patterns. The 
BN structure, as well as the medical idioms, are highly related to the type of reasoning that is taking 
place. For that reason, we extend the use of idioms beyond only reasoning about evidence. We 
propose medical idioms that represent additional types of reasoning, such as interventional and 
counterfactual reasoning - analyses which are not uncommon in medical applications. 
 
Idioms act as a library of patterns for BN development. The model expert connects elicited knowledge 
with idioms and reuses the most appropriate. Consequently, for developing medical BNs the model 
expert must first understand the role each elicited variable plays as a component of clinical reasoning, 
and then select the medical idiom best describing the related reasoning process. So, before developing 
the BN structure using idioms, elicited variables should be classified, based on their role in clinical 
reasoning as illustrated in the classical diagnostic and management feedback loops described in Figure 
8: 
1. Conditions (C) indicate states of health, whether normal or abnormal. A condition might be 
further distinguished as a disease, a disorder or a syndrome. However, we use the term 
condition as a broad-neutral term.  
2. Manifestations (M) are observable consequences of a condition. They are regarded as part of 
the condition’s semiotics and are classified according to the condition that triggers them.  
Manifestations can be further grouped into the following categories:  
a. Symptom (Sy) is a subjective feeling or departure from normal function which is 
apparent only to a patient (e.g fatigue) 
b. Sign (Si) is an objective indication of the condition that can be observed by clinicians. 
c. Medical Test (MT) is a procedure performed to diagnose or monitor a medical 
condition and/or a sign. 
3. Risk Factors (RF) are observable attributes, characteristics or exposures of an individual that 
increase his likelihood of developing a medical condition or a manifestation of it. Risk factors 
are regarded as part of condition’s aetiology and are classified according to the condition that 
they influence.  
4. Pathogenic Mechanisms (PM) are unobservable mechanisms that describe the pathogenesis/ 
development of a condition. They are also part of a condition’s aetiology as they explain the 
impact of some risk factors on the condition. Pathogenic mechanisms can be distinguished 
from conditions as they normally cannot explain manifestations [48]. However, as more 
diagnostic tools become available, the boundary between conditions and pathogenic 
mechanisms becomes weaker. 
5. Treatment (T) represents the clinical management to treat or cure a condition, described as 
healthcare. 
6. Comorbidities (CC) are medical conditions that exist simultaneously in the same patient [57]. 
The origin of a comorbidity may lay in the anatomical proximity of the diseased organs, the 
singular pathogenic mechanism of the number of conditions or the cause-effect relationship 
between conditions. Comorbidities play a crucial role in diagnosis and treatment 
recommendations [46], [47]. Two comorbid conditions can be entirely unrelated. On the other 
hand, when two comorbid conditions are related, the second or subsequent condition can 
cause, be caused, or be otherwise related to the first condition.  
7. Complications (Cm) are unfavourable elevations or consequences of a condition or a 
treatment. The condition itself can exacerbate, manifesting more severe symptomology or 
even causing another condition, a comorbidity. A treatment can also result in adverse events. 
A complication is so named because it complicates the situation. Thus, accounting for it is an 
important step for prognosis or treatment selection.   
The above classifications represent the information that clinicians normally use for describing a 
condition.  Thus, these are variables that are usually present in a medical BN. We do not claim that a 
variable necessarily has a unique classification. The role of a variable in the clinical reasoning might 
vary in different medical contexts. For example, clinicians in a cardiac clinic may see obesity as a risk 
factor, while in another clinic obesity might be the condition in question. However, when developing 
a BN for a specific medical problem, a unique variable classification should be feasible, although there 
might still be cases where a variable has more than one classification. The multipurpose of a variable 
may be due to different variables that trigger, or are triggered by, it. For instance, a long bone fracture 
can be a sign of limb injury but also a risk factor for bleeding. This is not an issue when using medical 
idioms as overlap among idioms is allowed.   
After classifying each elicited variable, the model expert should consider how the classified variables 
relate to one another. This should lead to subset of variables grouped together. Each subset should 
then be examined in terms of the flowchart shown in Figure 9 to determine which idiom is best 
represented. In the remainder of this section the proposed medical idioms are defined in detail. 
 
 Figure 9. Flowchart for selecting the right medical idiom 
4.1 Manifestation idiom 
The manifestation idiom models the uncertain causal relationship between a condition and related 
manifestation variables. It can be considered an instantiation of the measurement idiom, where 
diagnostic inference is normally performed. As mentioned in the measurement idiom presented in 
Section 2.2, the condition should exist before its effects are manifested. Figure 10 illustrates an 
example of the examination idiom, where coronary artery disease is the unknown condition clinicians 
are seeking to diagnose or rule out using manifestation variables including medical test results and 
the patient’s signs and symptoms.  
 
Figure 10. An example of the manifestation idiom 
The inaccuracy of each manifestation variable, such as what an observed manifestation variable tells 
us about the condition, is captured as false positive and false negative rates. Another source of 
inaccuracy is the human actors’ reliability in providing and interpreting the examination variables. This 
leads to the following extension of the manifestation idiom. 
4.2 Manifestation reliability idiom 
The manifestation reliability idiom models reliability of manifestation variables observed or 
interpreted by human actors. It makes explicit the notion that evidence provided or interpreted by 
human actors can be fallible. The manifestation reliability idiom shown in Figure 11 is an instance of 
the measurement idiom. The reliability of a reported symptom represents certainty on the degree of 
truthfulness and accuracy the observer uses to weight the patient’s description of their own condition. 
The reliability of a symptom might be defined by many factors, such as the patient’s objectivity and 
veracity (Figure 12a). This version of the idiom can also be represented using an object-oriented 
structure as shown in Figure 12b. The proposed decomposition of reliability is simply an instance of 
the definition/synthesis idiom. Patient’s objectivity and veracity can be modelled either as Boolean 
(Yes/No) or ranked nodes (e.g. underestimate, correct, overestimate). Ranked scales are particularly 
useful for chronic conditions. For example, suffering from a chronic condition can also bring about 
concomitant physiological and psychological disorders such as depression. A patient with depression 
may overestimate some of their symptoms, such as fatigue. Alternately, a patient suffering from a 
chronic condition may become conditioned to some symptoms. For instance, someone suffering with 
arthritis can become used to pain. This can result in underestimation of recurring pain. When a 
clinician treats that patient for many years, they may recognise whether a patient’s self-assessment 
needs to be recalibrated for under- or overestimation. The reliability of a sign represents a clinician’s 
certainty of observation. If we do not assume the clinician’s reliability to be perfect, then the 
examination reliability idiom can be extended in a similar way to symptom reliability as shown in 
Figure 12. Reliability of a medical test result represents the clinician’s potentially unreliable and 
subjective judgment when interpreting, whether the test result was positive or negative. 
 
Figure 11. An example of the manifestation reliability idiom 
 
 
Figure 12.(a) Symptom reliability idiom. (b) Symptom reliability idiom using an object-oriented structure 
The more reliable any manifestation variable provided by human actors is, the closer we can consider 
it to the real condition. Figure 13a shows an example of the manifestation reliability idiom where no 
evidence on reliability of the reported examination variables is entered. When we know that the 
reported examination variables are reliable, certainty for the presence of the condition increases 
(Figure 13b). However, when the reported manifestation variables are not reliable their impact on the 
condition diminishes (Figure 13c). When more than one sign, symptom, or diagnostic test is available, 
common reliability variables might be used to influence all the signs, symptoms, and diagnostic tests 
separately (Figure 14). This is because a patient’s reliability on the presence of one symptom may 
affect confidence in the reliability of another, and equally, a clinician’s confirmation bias about one 
sign or judgement regarding a test result may affect their reliability about another. 
  
 
 
Figure 13. (a) An example of the manifestation reliability idiom when no evidence about the reliability is available. (b) An 
example of the manifestation reliability idiom when reliable evidence is available. (c) An example of the manifestation 
reliability idiom when non-reliable evidence is available. 
 
 
Figure 14. Example of the manifestation reliability idiom with common reliability variables 
4.3 Risk factor idiom 
The risk factor idiom models the uncertain relationships between an observable risk factor and the 
variables it affects (Figure 15). Risk factors occur before, or simultaneously with, their consequences. 
A risk factor can be an observable attribute or pre-existing comorbid condition that increases 
someone’s likelihood of developing a condition, such as having a family history of cardiac problems 
increases the likelihood of developing a coronary artery disease. A risk factor can also be the reason 
why a manifestation variable has arisen or become exaggerated and can also be an inhibiting or 
supporting factor for choosing a treatment. 
 
Figure 15. An example of the risk factor idiom 
4.4 Pathogenesis idiom 
The pathogenesis idiom models hidden underlying relationships between a risk factor and the 
condition. Sometimes a risk factor influences directly upon an individual’s chances of developing the 
condition (modelled using the risk factor idiom). However, more often risk factors affect the condition 
indirectly through some unobserved pathogenic mechanism. For instance, obesity and diabetes are 
risk factors for developing coronary artery disease, however they do not cause the condition directly. 
Rather, they do so indirectly through the pathogenic mechanism of causing plaque to build up in 
arteries (Figure 16). As blocked arteries is an unobserved pathogenic mechanism, it cannot be 
considered a risk factor for coronary artery disease. Hence, the pathogenesis idiom is more 
appropriate than the risk factor idiom.  
 
Figure 16. An example of the pathogenesis idiom 
4.5 Comorbidity common cause idiom 
The comorbidity common cause idiom models uncertain relationships between two conditions that 
share the same causes (Figure 17a). In this idiom one condition should always be a comorbid condition, 
while the other can be any condition group; a comorbid condition, the condition in question or a 
pathogenic mechanism. Based on the cause-consequence idiom, observing a cause, such as a risk 
factor, affects all its consequences (Figure 17b). The diverging connection between the two conditions 
makes them independent when their common cause is observed (Figure 17c). In case the common 
cause is not observed, then the two conditions become dependent (Figure 17d). The proposed 
comorbidity common cause idiom is similar to the heterogeneity model proposed by Valderas et al. 
[46].  
 
Figure 17. (a) An example of the comorbidity common cause idiom. (b) An example of the comorbidity common cause idiom, 
where the cause is observed. (c) An example of the comorbidity common cause idiom, where the cause and the comorbid 
condition are observed. (d) An example of the comorbidity common cause idiom, where only the comorbid condition is 
observed  
4.6 Comorbidity common symptomology idiom 
The comorbidity common symptomology idiom models uncertain relationships between two 
conditions that share the same consequences (Figure 18a). Like the comorbidity common cause idiom, 
one condition should always be a comorbid condition while the other can be any condition group: a 
comorbid condition; the condition in question; or, a pathogenic mechanism. When observing the 
shared consequences, such as a manifestation variable, both conditions are updated (Figure 18b). The 
converging connection between the two conditions makes them dependent when their common 
consequences are observed. As we can see in Figure 18c, knowing that the patient also has a lung 
cancer reduces the likelihood of a cardiac problem. In other words, having lung cancer is enough to 
explain the presence of chest pain. This is known as explaining away [58] or discounting [33]. In cases 
where the consequences are not evidence variables, the two conditions become independent (Figure 
18d).  
 
Figure 18. (a) An example of the comorbidity common symptomology idiom. (b) An example of the comorbidity common 
symptomology idiom, where the consequence is observed. (c) An example of the comorbidity common symptomology idiom, 
where the consequence and the comorbid condition are observed. (d) An example of the comorbidity common symptomology 
idiom, where only the comorbid condition is observed 
4.7 Complication idiom 
The complication idiom models the uncertain process between a condition or treatment and its 
unfavourable consequence. Timewise, the resulting consequence is a late effect. This idiom can be 
considered an instance of the cause-consequence idiom. An example of the complication idiom is 
shown in Figure 19. Heart attack can be an unfavourable future consequence of a coronary artery 
disease.  
 
Figure 19. An example of the complication idiom 
4.8 Treatment idiom 
The treatment idiom models the uncertain process of condition management. A treatment is an 
important part of a BN as it describes a clinical decision. Figure 20a shows that suffering from coronary 
artery disease influences clinicians’ decisions with respect to prescribing medication that reduces a 
patient’s chances of having a heart attack.  Given the medical context, a treatment can be affected by 
other comorbid conditions, risk factors, or previous treatment strategies. The treatment idiom is 
highly related to the type of reasoning process that takes place. For instance, if reasoning from 
evidence is performed and treatment is the hypothesis, then a structure such as the one shown in 
Figure 20a is adequate. However, if we want to capture the effect of a hypothetical treatment, then 
interventional reasoning should be performed, and a model with causal relationships is needed. Thus, 
following the graph surgery proposed by Pearl, the variable on which we intervene should be made 
independent of its causes. As a result, all the arcs pointing towards the intervened variable are 
removed, as shown in Figure 20b, and the effect of the hypothetical treatment 𝑇 = 𝑡 on heart attack 
is estimated as 𝑃(𝐶𝑚 = 𝑐𝑚|𝑑𝑜(𝑡)).  
 
Typically, randomised control experiments [59] are used to learn cause-effect relationships from 
experimental data The randomisation process samples data by avoiding possible selection bias and 
confounding. In observational studies a subject that receives a treatment may do so because it has a 
more severe condition than those who remain untreated. Thus, any statistical association derived 
from observational data runs the risk of confounding the beneficial effect of the treatment and the 
underlying greater risk in those subjects who received the treatment. To arrive at an unconfounding 
treatment effect we must supress any confounder that influences both the treatment and the variable 
the treatment affects.  Based on the example shown in Figure 20a, the variables T and Cm are 
unconfounded if and only if the following holds:  𝑃(𝐶𝑚 = 𝑐𝑚|𝑑𝑜(𝑡)) = 𝑃(𝑐𝑚|𝑡) for all values 𝑇 =
 𝑡 and 𝐶𝑚 =  𝑐𝑚. This equality states that T and Cm are not confounded when the association 
observed in the data between the two variables is the same as the association that would have been 
measured in a randomised control experiment, where T is randomly assigned [60]. Looking at Figure 
18a, we can easily conclude that the equality is not correct since there is an open backdoor path 
between T and Cm (T ← C → Cm). One way to adjust for a confounder and have identifiable causal 
effects is to block the backdoor paths. In such a case we have the following equality: 
𝑃(𝐶𝑚 = 𝑐𝑚|𝑑𝑜(𝑡)) =  ∑ 𝑃(𝑐𝑚|𝑡, 𝑐)𝑃(𝑐)𝑐 , which gives an unbiased estimate for the causal effect of 
T on Cm. In other words, when the confounders are observed, their confounding effect is neutralised. 
However, when they are unobserved, a solution is to use the do operator that acts similarly with a 
randomised experiment, making the treatment independent from its causes as shown in Figure 20b. 
 
 
Figure 20. (a) An example of the treatment idiom with decision arcs. (b) An example of the treatment idiom with no decision 
arcs 
4.9 Treatment reliability idiom 
The treatment reliability idiom models reliability of the treatment’s application. When a treatment 
such as surgery is performed by clinicians, the treatment’s application presents as clinical practice. 
When a treatment such as medication is taken by the patient, the treatment’s application represents 
how well the patient follows clinical instructions. The latter can include keeping the medication 
refrigerated prior to administration, taking the medication on an empty stomach, or even following 
frequency and dosage as prescribed by the clinician. An example of the treatment reliability idiom is 
shown in Figure 21. Figure 22 shows that whether the treatment is reliable or not has no impact on 
heart attack when the treatment is not applied. 
 
Figure 21. An example of the treatment reliability idiom 
  
Figure 22. An example of the treatment reliability idiom with conditional probabilities 
In Figure 23 the reasoning process is presented. At first, we observe that the patient suffers from 
coronary artery disease and medication is prescribed (Figure 23a). The positive treatment effect 
becomes more prominent when the treatment is reliable (Figure 23b). Alternately, when the 
treatment is not reliable, its positive effect markedly diminishes (Figure 23c).  
  
 
Figure 23. (a) An example of the treatment reliability idiom, where the condition is present, and the treatment is applied. (b) 
An example of the treatment reliability idiom, where the condition is present, the treatment is applied, and it is reliable. (c) 
An example of the treatment reliability idiom, where the condition is present, the treatment is applied, and it is unreliable 
4.10 Counterfactual treatment idiom 
Thus far we have presented idioms where reasoning about evidence or interventions is performed. 
However, in medical problems realistic counterfactual questions regarding the uncertain effect of 
hypothetical treatments may also be considered. The counterfactual treatment idiom helps us to 
compare what has happened with what could have happened if an alternative treatment had been 
applied. Using a twin network, we can compare the observed effect of an observed treatment in the 
actual world, with the hypothetical treatment effect in the hypothetical world. An important 
difference between the twin network proposed by Pearl and the counterfactual treatment idiom is 
that the variable on which we intervene is a treatment variable. As explained in Section 4.9, when 
evaluating an unconfounded treatment effect we should adjust for all confounders by making the 
treatment independent from its causes. Thus, even if Pearl suggests graph surgery only in the 
hypothetical world, counterfactual treatment idiom is a special case as the decision arrows that point 
towards the treatment should be removed not only in the hypothetical, but also in the real world. An 
illustrative example of the counterfactual treatment idiom is presented in Figure 24. In this example, 
we want to know whether heart attack would have been prevented if a proper medication had been 
given.  
 
  
Figure 24. An example of the counterfactual treatment idiom 
4.11 Combining the medical idioms: the core BN model for coronary artery disease 
An important advantage of medical idioms is that they propose logical reasoning patterns that can be 
combined, reused and applied generically to help develop full medical BNs. Following the examples 
described above, a simplified diagnostic BN for coronary artery disease developed using medical 
idioms is presented in Figure 25. Based on this presented diagnostic BN, we conclude the following: 
1. Not all the medical idioms may be required in a particular BN structure. 
2. Any medical idiom may be used more than once. 
3. It is common for medical idioms to overlap. The reasons for these overlaps are: (a) an idiom 
might be the subset of another idiom, such as the risk factor idiom can be the subset of the 
pathogenesis idiom as shown in Figure 25; and (b) a variable may have more than one role in 
clinical reasoning. For instance, a long bone fracture is a sign of a limb injury but at the same 
time it is also the risk factor for increased tissue perfusion.       
 
Figure 25. Simplified diagnostic BN for cardiac problem with visible medical idioms 
5. Medical idiom validation  
The proposed medical idioms have been inspired by a range of medical BNs developed by members 
of our research team over the last seven years [61], [62], [63], [64]. Currently, these medical idioms 
are being applied in development of medical BNs. In this section, the list of medical idioms is going to 
be assessed against established medical BNs. 
5.1 Case study: assess the causal coherence of the BN structure 
The example shown in Figure 26 has been published by Constantinou et al., 2015 [63]. Figure 26a 
illustrates a standard statistical regression model without an underlying causal structure.  Figured 26b 
presents a claimed causal BN for head injury learned purely from data [65]. Using the proposed 
medical idioms, the model expert can easily understand that even if the BN structure follows the 
associations present in the data, it is not causally coherent. For instance, brain scan result is a medical 
test. Following the manifestation idiom, a medical test is a consequence of the outcome and not the 
cause of it. In addition, delay in arrival is a risk factor of the outcome and not a consequence of it. As 
a result, medical idioms can help clinicians and model experts to assess and correct the BN structure.   
 
Figure 26. (a) Standard statistical regression model learned from data. (b) "Causal" model learned purely from data proposed 
by Sakellaropoulos & Nikiforidis, 1999 [65]. (c) Sensible causal model with missing/ unobserved variables proposed by 
Constantinou et al., 2015 [63] embedded with medical idioms 
In Figure 26c, Costantinou et al. proposed a sensible causal structure. The proposed causal structure 
is in accordance with the developed medical idioms, as it is highlighted in Figure 26c. This is an 
additional reassurance that the causal BN structure is indeed sensible. Constantinou et al. do not 
explicitly describe the use of medical idioms for developing the BN structure. However, the process of 
using logical causal reasoning patterns has been followed unintentionally. Having a sensible causal 
structure may not appear to deliver an appreciable benefit when simply performing prediction or 
diagnosis. However, a BN with a coherent causal structure is not a black-box model and its reasoning 
must be explained if it is to be trusted [66], [67]. In addition, having a BN structure that represents the 
true causal mechanism of a disease is absolutely necessary when modelling interventions or 
counterfactual scenarios.   
5.2 Case study: validate against a known accurate knowledge-driven medical BN 
The medical BN shown in Figure 27 was developed by Yet et al. [62] to predict acute traumatic 
coagulopathy, with the information available, within the first 10 minutes of patient care. The BN 
structure was developed and refined systematically with domain experts [68]. The model has been 
extensively validated and shown to have a good predictive performance [62].  Figure 26 shows those 
medical idioms that are sufficient to connect the variables elicited from experts and are consistent 
with the initial causally coherent BN structure. More specifically, two main causal factors for trauma 
induced coagulopathy are tissue injury and tissue perfusion. Both are pathogenic mechanisms that are 
part of trauma induced coagulopathy’s aetiology. The risk factors for tissue injury are the mechanism 
and energy of injury, as well as injury severity of each body part. The injury severity is affected again 
by the mechanism and energy of injury and it is manifested in the appearance of some recorded signs, 
symptoms and tests. For instance, an unstable pelvis is a sign of pelvic injury. All blood related 
manifestations for the injured body parts can cause changes in tissue perfusion at the same time. 
Pathophysiological factors such as lactate or base excess are indicators of tissue perfusion. Finally, 
dilution of blood constituents through administration of excessive prehospital resuscitation clear 
fluids is a causal factor for coagulopathy. In-depth medical details on the variables and causal 
relationships captured by this model are available in [69]. 
 
 
Figure 27. Coagulopathy model, developed by Yet et al. [62], with visible medical idioms 
6. Conclusion 
One of the major issues to consider when developing a BN using knowledge elicitation methods is to 
ensure a coherent structure. Most published medical BNs are presented as complete pieces of work 
lacking explanation of how the network’s structure was developed and justification of why it 
represents the correct structure for the given medical application. In this paper this issue has been 
addressed by proposing generally applicable and reusable medical reasoning patterns, called medical 
idioms, that can standardise and assist in developing sensibly structured medical BNs. The proposed 
method complements and extends the idiom-based approach introduced by Neil, Fenton, and Nielsen 
in 2000. This paper presented examples of their generic idioms instantiated for specific medical 
purposes. Further, this paper has extended the use of idioms to represent the additional approaches 
of interventional and counterfactual reasoning.  
 
The proposed medical idioms were developed as part of the EPSRC-funded PAMBAYESIAN project 
(https://pambayesian.org/) and are applied on two medical BNs presently under development for the 
conditions: (1) gestational diabetes mellitus; and, (2) rheumatoid arthritis. In this paper a third 
simplified case study on coronary artery disease was used to illustrate each medical idiom and the 
approach to combining idioms into a medical BN.  The proposed idioms were assessed against medical 
BNs with non-sensible and sensible causal structure.  
 
Idioms have a natural logic that mimics human reasoning processes. For instance, we would more 
naturally say that infection may be the cause of fever and not the alternative. Natural causal reasoning 
patterns can thus be represented using idioms. As described in Section 4, our proposed medical idioms 
act as a collection of meaningful reasoning patterns that represent essential reasoning steps in patient 
condition, diagnosis, prediction and management. While the medical idioms presented in this paper 
may not be exhaustive, they are currently capable of representing the main activities of clinical care 
and are sufficiently generic to be applicable in most common medical situations. Moreover, the use 
of medical idioms can be beneficial in the following ways:  
1. Standardise and assist medical BN development: As demonstrated in Section 4.11 combining 
several medical idioms incrementally makes easier to develop cohesive medical BNs. The 
model expert only needs to connect elicited knowledge with the proposed idioms and reuse 
the most appropriate one.  
2. Assess BN structure: As explained in Section 5, a BN structure that does not obey the idiomatic 
reasoning patterns is a strong indicator of a poor structure and understanding. Thus, medical 
idioms can help clinicians and model experts to assess and correct the BN structure, as well as 
improve their understanding of the underlying processes. 
3. Enhance explainability: Based on lessons learned during the PAMBAYSIAN project, the visual 
representation of the medical idioms makes the BN structure easier to explain by model 
experts but also more easily understood by clinicians. 
4. Improve communication between model and domain experts: Again, based on the 
knowledge gained during the PAMBAYESIAN project, medical idioms had a two-fold positive 
impact on the communication between model experts and clinicians. First, apart from helping 
connect the elicited variables, they were useful when eliciting experts’ knowledge. Looking 
for the elements captured in medical idioms can guide the knowledge elicitation process. 
Second, and arising as a direct consequence of the previous benefit, the representation of the 
medical idioms in the BN structure significantly improved the review process. For model 
experts it was easier to explain the structure to clinicians, and for clinicians it was easier to 
understand and review the BN structure.         
 
We believe that the medical idioms proposed in this paper are meaningful reasoning patterns that 
show the way towards a more systematic and coherent process for constructing complex medical BNs. 
Future work should focus on validating the proposed medical idioms against other related approaches, 
explained in Section 3, and exploring further the benefits described above when using medical idioms. 
These could bring us closer to a more generic and effective BN development process. 
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